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the like. The meaning of these concepts necessarily varies with
the experience, outlook, even idiosyncracies of the person de-
fining them. Although we have assumed that obscenity does
exist and that we "know it when [we] see it," we are manifestly
unable to describe it in advance except by reference to concepts
so elusive that they fail to distinguish clearly between pro-
tected and unprotected speech.4"
The new standards raised in Miller, whether good or bad, leave questions
unanswered. The present composition of the Court indicates that forth-
coming decisions, which are needed to resolve the conflicts, will probably
impose strict regulations on obscenity. Hopefully, the Court, in attempt-
ing to clarify these issues, will remember that the Constitution requires
that the regulation of obscenity "conform to procedures that will ensure
against the curtailment of constitutionally protected expression, which
is often separated from obscenity only by a dim and uncertain line.""
MITCHELL R. BLOOMBERG
"THE RIGHT, JUSTICE AND WELFARE OF THE PURCHASING
AND CONSUMING PUBLIC"?-NO LIABILITY FOR
BREACH OF WARRANTY FOR DEFECTIVE
SECONDARY CONTAINER
The plaintiff purchased a carton of Coca-Cola from a grocery store
operated by the defendant Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., Florida. When the
plaintiff lifted the carton from the display rack of the store, the bottom
of the carton allegedly failed and as a result, one bottle dropped to the
floor, broke and caused injury to the plaintiff. Defendant, Winn-Dixie,
admitted the purchase and the fact that the drinks were bottled, packaged
and supplied to it for retail sales by the co-defendant, Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Company of Miami. Coca-Cola denied all applicable elements of
the complaint. The trial court granted defendants' motions for directed
verdict on the counts of implied warranty and submitted the case to the
jury only on issues of negligence. The jury returned a verdict for the
defendants and final judgment was entered. On appeal, the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held, affirmed:' There is no warranty
of merchantability by the bottler in favor of a remote buyer as to the
carton.2 Schuessler v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 279 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1973).
43. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2647 (1973) (dissenting opinion)
(citations omitted).
44. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963).
1. Affirmed only in respect to the issue of extension of implied warranty to manufac-
turer. Judgment as to defendant, Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., was reversed and remanded.
2. There was no testimony which indicated who actually manufactured the paper
CASES NOTED
Although the contemporary evolution of the law of products liabil-
ity rests on the various foundations of negligence, implied warranty and
strict liability,' the law in Florida may be traced to the use of contract
warranty principles as a basis of recovery.4 For many years in Florida,
no recovery for breach of implied warranty of fitness was allowed with-
out privity between the parties (Florida courts often do not distinguish
between fitness and merchantability)." The requirement of privity was
eventually eliminated in a case where a manufacturer of food products
was held liable for injuries sustained by a consumer.' Once the implied
warranty of merchantability was extended to the manufacture of food
products, the responsibilities of retailers in the absence of privity took
hold.7 The citadel of privity has weakened in Florida," as it has nation-
ally under the great weight of a vast number of court decisions.'
Many jurisdictions have extended the theory of implied warranty
beyond the traditionally strictly confined areas of food and drink for
human consumption to include animal food and products intended for
bodily use such as cosmetics. The implied warranty of merchantability
applicable to products sold by the retailer for human consumption was
extended to include the bottle as well as its contents in Canada Dry
Bottling Co. v. Shaw."° However, in Florida, the first such extension ap-
peared in Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan," and involved the
containers of products for human consumption. This rule was applied to
manufacturers, in Renninger v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., which held that
carton in which the bottles were packaged. Testimony merely revealed that Coca-Cola
Bottling Company supplied its co-defendants with Coca-Cola bottled, packaged and ready
for retail sale.
3. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 641 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
4. Ausness, From Caveat Emptor to Strict Liability: A Review of Products Liability in
Florida, 24 U. FrA. L. RaV. 410 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Ausness].
S. Smith v. Burdine's, Inc., 144 Fla. 500, 198 So. 223 (1940). Plaintiff suffered injuries
after using a brand of lipstick purchased in reliance on a saleswoman's assurance that the
product was safe. The court held that the employee's conduct gave rise to an implied war-
ranty of fitness and that the plaintiff was allowed to recover from the retailer since the
parties were in privity. For the definitions of warranties of fitness and merchantability, see
UCC §§ 2-314, 2-315.
6. Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313 (1944). See also Sencer
v. Carl's Markets, Inc., 45 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1950).
7. Ausness, supra note 3, at 414.
8. Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313 (1944).
9. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 97, at 655.
10. 118 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960) [hereinafter referred to as Shaw]; Foley v.
Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965), aff'g 172 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
In Foley the court suggested that Jordan stood for an extension permitting suit against both
the bottler and the retailer. The court added, however, that it would not at that time extend
the doctrine of implied warranty to all containers of food, but the bottle and its contents
were so closely related that it was difficult if not impossible to draw a distinction.
11. 62 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1953) [hereinafter referred to as Jordan]. It held that the bottler
of a beverage intended for consumption impliedly warrants to the ultimate consumer that
the beverage is reasonably fit for that purpose. In Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154
Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313 (1944), the court stated, "[t]he implied warranty theory of liability
comports with the general trend of the best reasoned cases." Id. at 876, 19 So. 2d at 316. See
Ausness, supra note 3, at 415.
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a "purchaser of a bottle of milk is entitled to rely on the bottler to the
extent that the container in which the product is packaged will be reason-
ably fit for the purpose for which it was intended."'1 2 However, in that
same year, the Supreme Court of Florida, in Foley v. Weaver Drugs,
Inc.," refused to extend implied warranty liability to retailers for injur-
ies caused by defective containers. The court concluded that public pol-
icy did not dictate holding the retailer to the same liability for the mer-
chantability and fitness of the container of food products as is imposed
upon him for the food contents. Foley modified Shaw as it applied to
retailers although the court did nct decide whether the bottler was liable
for injuries from the defective container.
In 1967, in Gay v. Kelly, 4 the First District held that a secondary
container, a cardboard carton, was to be treated as a product for ulti-
mate bodily use, and that privity was not a requirement for recovery
against the manufacturer. It is important to note that the court in Foley
reached its decision without the benefit of Florida Statute § 672.2-314
(1967), which became effective approximately two years subsequent to
the decision. Section 672.2-314 contains the following provisions which
dictate the liability of the retailer in the present case:
(1) ... A warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is
implied in a contract for their sale, if the seller is a merchant
with respect to goods of that kind....
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as:
(e) Are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as
the agreement may require;
The statute imposes a warranty of merchantability on the retailer
which applies not merely to the product which is the intent of the pur-
chase, but also to the container. Whether the product is adequately con-
tained and packaged within the provisions of the statute would rest on
its suitability and intended function at the time of purchase.
Thus, the law seemed to be clearly established as indicated by the
court in Reese v. Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co.," which, in consider-
ing the Shaw and the Renninger decisions, stated that
if the bottler or manufacturer of a product intended for human
consumption packages its product in a glass container and the
product is such that it cannot be ordinarily consumed without
12. 171 So. 2d 602, 604 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) [hereinafter referred to as Renninger]
(recovery against a bottler was granted).
13. 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965) [hereinafter referred to as Foley].
14. 200 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967). The facts here are almost identical to those in
Schuessler. The court stated that Florida law had not yet reached the point where the
privity has been deemed unnecessary in all suits based upon implied warranty. It concluded
that privity no longer is required in an implied warranty suit by a consumer against a
manufacturer. However, the court concluded that the defendant must be proven to be
the manufacturer in question.
15. 256 So. 2d 392 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1972).
CASES NOTED
at the same time handling and using the container itself, then
the manufacturer impliedly warrants that the container is
reasonably fit for the purpose for which it is intended. Under
such circumstances, if a defect is shown to be the cause of the
container breaking or exploding, then liability for any damages
suffered by a purchaser of the product may be imposed on the
manufacturer or bottler.16
In Schuessler, the Fourth District was faced with the question of
whether a bottler impliedly warrants the merchantability of a secondary
container to a remote buyer. Distinguishing the decision of its sister court
in Gay v. Kelly," upon the same question, the court in Schuessler stated:
"It would seem to us to be more sound to predicate the bottler's respon-
sibility on the reasonable needs of the consumer rather than the bottler's
status as a manufacturer."' 8 The Schuessler court had the opportunity to
use Gay v. Kelly, a case as nearly on point as one could hope for, to step
forward and extend the holding to the instance where the bottler did not
necessarily manufacture the carton. Instead, the court adhered to the
reasoning of the 1944 Supreme Court of Florida in Blanton v. Cudahy
Packing Co. 9 which stated:
The rationale of the implied warranty theory of liability is in
effect that the right of recovery by injured consumers ought
not to depend upon or turn on the intricacies of the law of
sale nor upon the privity of contract, but should rest on right
justice and welfare of the general purchasing and consuming
public.
The Schuessler court, echoing the rationale applied almost thirty
years ago in Blanton, concluded that:
(1) the secondary container was readily subject to examina-
tion for soundness by the buyer who, therefore, had no need to
rely on the bottler;
(2) the carton was provided as a convenience only, and the
consumer was required to handle or use it in order to use the
consumable product, and
(3) the alleged defect was not of the type which as a matter
of common experience was more likely than not to have origi-
nated before the product left the bottler's possession.2°
The Schuessler court,21 relying upon the logic and reason promul-
gated by the pre-code decision in Blanton,2 reaches a conclusion which
16. Id. at 393.
17. 200 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
18. 279 So. 2d at 904.
19. 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313, 316 (1944) [hereinafter referred to as Blanton].
20. 279 So. 2d at 904.
21. Id. at 901.
22. Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313 (1944).
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the 1944 court refused to reach under the same rationale. It seems that
the Schuessler court has stepped backwards into the annals of legal his-
tory and has resurrected an already buried theory of caveat emptor2
The court's preference of subjecting the consumer, and possibly the re-
tailer, to the burden of dutifully inspecting the product's container ap-
pears to be an impediment to the development of the case law in Florida
which has established a theory of implied warranty for food and its
containers.24
In Schuessler the court does not indulge in a discussion of factors
which might prove crucial to reaching an enlightened decision. The
bottled drinks were more than likely contained not in a makeshift car-
ton, but one specifically designed and equipped to enable a consumer
to carry six bottles of the beverage conveniently. Both the bottles and
the carton were probably displayed as a unit and priced as a unit, with-
out a separate charge being made for the carton.
From the bottler's perspective, the carton was probably a market-
ing device which inevitably stimulated the sales of six bottles at a time.
If these facts had been inquired into and had been ascertained as stated
above, a more correct holding would have been that the manufacturer
impliedly warranted that the carton was fit for use as a receptacle to
carry the bottled drinks. From the consumer's perspective, the only one
considered by the court, the carton was a convenience. But the purchaser
of a "six-pack" of soda becomes the owner of the carton as well as of
the beverage since the store sells the carton as a unit with the beverage.
The fact that it is the container rather than the product inside which
causes injury does not make the injury any less a result of the manufac-
turer's breach of warranty. This reasoning should be extended to situ-
ations in which the secondary container, provided by the manufacturer,
is inadequate.
In Florida, a finding that a manufacturer, as distinguished from the
retailer of a product, may be held liable for breach of implied warranty
is made without regard to whether the plaintiff is in privity of contract.
This is true even for a product that is neither a dangerous instrumental-
ity nor a foodstuff.2 Surely if a court is able to find the manufacturer
liable for injury resulting from a bottle exploding in a "six-pack" car-
ton carried to the supermarket check-out counter,2 7 then the manufac-
turer should be equally liable where the carton is latently defective and
injury results.
23. Compare Ausness, supra note 3, at 410, with PROSSER, supra note 2, § 98, at 657,
and UNIFORM COMMERCML CODE §§ 2-314, 2-315.
24. Reese v. Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 256 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972);
Renninger v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 171 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
25. Vandercook & Son, Inc. v. Thorpe, 344 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Blanton v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1944).
26. Manhiem v. Ford Motor Co., 201 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1967).
27. Reese v. Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 256 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
CASES NOTED
Whether the alleged defect was of such a nature, that, as a matter
of common experience, it was more likely than not to have originated
before the product left the bottler's possession is a question of fact. Ulti-
mately the court's decision is one of public policy-who should bear the
burden of defective secondary containers, the manufacturer or the con-
sumer.28 Public policy, the right, justice and welfare of the general pur-
chasing and consuming public, demands that the manufacturer be liable
for breach of implied warranty of a secondary container when the injury
proximately follows from such defect. The functional distinctions be-
tween primary and secondary containers, in this age which has witnessed
an enormous revolution in the containerization process, should not be
determinative of liability. Whether it is a defect in the beverage bottle
or the beverage carton that causes injury is an artificial distinction which
speaks of glass and cardboard and not of reason. Perhaps only after con-
sideration of the manufacturer's purpose in creating the secondary con-
tainer and its functions to both the manufacturer and consumer, should
liability be affixed.
MICHAEL A. LUBIN
THE RIGHT OF A HUSBAND OR A MINOR'S PARENT
TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ABORTION DECISION
Plaintiffs, a married woman, an unmarried minor female, and three
Florida-licensed physicians specializing in family medicine' brought a
class action for declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida against officials of
the State of Florida, attacking the constitutionality of Florida Statutes
section 458.22(3),2 which required the written consent of husbands or
28. It should be noted, however, that in Schuessler, since a deep-pocket retailer was held
liable, the court was not faced with a policy decision which would place the burden of the
loss on the consumer.
1. The Supreme Court in Doe v. Bolton, 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973) (the companion case to
Roe), held that a physician consulted by pregnant women had standing to sue as one against
whom an abortion statute "directly operate[s] in the event he procures an abortion that
does not meet the statutory exceptions and conditions." Id. at 745. The Court found a suf-
ficiently direct threat of personal detriment to a doctor in this situation, and held that he
should not be required to undergo criminal prosecution as a sole means of seeking relief.
Coe v. Gerstein, No. 72-1842 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 1973) follows Doe in this respect.
2. FLA. STAT. § 458.22(3) (Supp. 1972) [hereinafter the spousal or parental consent
requirement]. The pertinent part of the statute is as follows:
(3) WRITINGS REQUIRED.-One of the following shall be obtained by the
physician prior to terminating a pregnancy:
(a) The written request of the pregnant woman and, if she is married, the
written consent of her husband, unless the husband is voluntarily living apart from
the wife, or
(b) If the pregnant woman is under eighteen years of age and unmarried, in
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